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Editors' Summary 
THE  BROOKINGS  PANEL  on  Economic  Activity  held  its  sixty-first 
conference  in Washington,  D.C.,  on March 28 and 29,  1996. This issue 
of  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity  includes  the  articles  and 
discussions  presented  at that conference.  The  first article  rejects  the 
concept  of  a natural unemployment  rate by examining  the effects  of 
downward  wage  rigidity,  and calls  into  question  policies  that would 
target zero  inflation.  The  second  considers  the Federal Reserve's  ex- 
perience with money targets and the lessons  for rules versus discretion 
and  appropriate targets  for  U.S.  monetary  policymaking.  The  third 
article examines the Tequila effect of the December  1994 Mexican peso 
crisis in a sample of developing  countries and analyzes the factors that 
make a country vulnerable  to financial crisis.  The fourth reviews  the 
evidence  from the previously communist-controlled  countries of central 
Europe and the former Soviet  Union to show that radical programs of 
liberalization  and price  stabilization  have  been  more  successful  than 
gradual reforms,  in both economic  and political  terms.  And the final 
article traces the postwar decline  in national saving to a redistribution 
of resources from younger to older generations and a significant increase 
in the consumption  propensities  of the elderly. 
I  N  B O T H  E C O N O M I  C research and policymaking,  analysis of inflation 
and stabilization  typically  rests on a natural unemployment rate model. 
The key property of such models is that only one rate of unemployment 
can be  sustained  in the  long  run,  and there is  no  long-run  trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation. Inflation speeds up or slows down 
indefinitely,  depending  on whether unemployment  is below  or above 
its  natural rate,  and there  is  no  systematic  tendency  for  inflation  to 
change if unemDloVment is at the natural rate. This makes the natural 
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rate of  unemployment  a target for  stabilization  policies  that aim  to 
control inflation,  and a benchmark for long-run economic  projections 
such as those  used  to forecast  budget surpluses or deficits.  Since  any 
steady inflation rate is compatible with operating at the natural rate, the 
model has also been used to advocate zero inflation as the appropriate 
target for stabilization policy.  In the first article in this volume,  George 
Akerlof,  William  Dickens,  and George  Perry question  the  standard 
version of the natural rate model and the implication that zero inflation 
is the appropriate target for monetary policy.  They produce evidence 
that downward rigidity in nominal wages  is an important feature of the 
U.S.  economy  and construct  a model  of  inflation  that includes  this 
feature.  Using  this  model,  they  show  that the sustainable  rate of  un- 
employment consistent with steady inflation is not a unique natural rate. 
Indeed,  the sustainable unemployment  rate itself depends on the infla- 
tion  rate.  Simulations  of  the  model  and direct estimation  with  time- 
series  data suggest  that the  lowest  sustainable  unemployment  rate is 
achievable  with  a  moderately  low,  steady  inflation  rate.  With  zero 
inflation the sustainable  unemployment  rate is measurably higher and 
real output and employment  are sacrificed. 
The authors begin by reviewing  ethnographic evidence  that explains 
why concern for worker morale and fairness leads rational firms to avoid 
nominal  wage  cuts,  even  though  real  wage  cuts  arising  from  price 
inflation that is beyond the control of the firm are acceptable.  Nominal 
wage cuts are acceptable only when serious difficulties threaten a firm's 
survival.  They then assemble  evidence  documenting the importance of 
downward wage rigidity in practice.  The distribution of wage changes 
is  asymmetric  in a particular way.  Data on  manufacturing industries 
collected  by  the Bureau of  Labor Statistics  from  1959  to  1978  show 
that in any year, the distribution of wage changes follows  a conventional 
bell shape above the median change.  But below  the median, the distri- 
bution piles up at zero wage change,  and only a trivial fraction of wages 
decline.  Analyzing  union  settlements  from  1970  through  1994,  the 
authors find a similar absence of wage cuts and truncation of the distri- 
bution of  wage  changes  at zero in all years except  1983.  In that year, 
the end of a period of large,  recession-induced  losses  for many firms, 
wages were cut in 15 percent of settlements.  This particular observation 
is consistent  with the idea that wage cuts are acceptable when firms are 
in serious  trouble.  The  authors also  report on their own  1995  survey William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xi 
that asked individuals  in the Washington,  D.C.,  area whether they had 
experienced  a wage cut. Of 409 respondents who had not changed jobs, 
only  seven  reported wage  cuts,  and four of those worked for the D.C. 
government,  which confronted a budget crisis. 
In contrast to these findings,  some recent studies using data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics  (PSID) have reported that a substan- 
tial fraction of wage  changes  are negative,  but Akerlof,  Dickens,  and 
Perry make a strong case  that these  conflicting  findings are spurious, 
arising simply  from measurement error. The PSID asks repondents to 
report the level  of their wages  in the previous year. Wage changes  are 
then calculated  as the difference  in these reported wage levels  for suc- 
cessive  years.  In  such  a calculation,  inaccuracies  in reporting wage 
levels  greatly  exaggerate  the  actual  frequency  of  wage  cuts.  Using 
evidence  about reporting errors in the PSID from a validation  survey, 
the authors apply typical  PSID  errors to their own  survey  that asked 
directly  about  wage  changes.  This  exercise  shows  that PSID  errors 
would  easily  account  for the high  frequency  of  wage  cuts calculated 
from the PSID data on wage  levels.  The authors further show that the 
frequency  of wage  cuts calculated  for the subset of PSID respondents 
who are union workers greatly exceeds  the trivial frequency of cuts in 
union wages  measured directly from other sources.  They conclude that 
the empirical evidence  strongly supports their hypothesis  that nominal 
wages  are rarely cut, except  when a firm is in serious financial trouble. 
To examine  the quantitative implications  of their hypothesis  for the 
macroeconomy,  Akerlof,  Dickens,  and Perry build nominal  wage  ri- 
gidity  into a formal stochastic  general-equilibrium  model that reflects 
the  optimizing  behavior  of  firms and workers  and takes  account  of 
stochastic  demand  and supply  shocks  to  individual  firms.  Individual 
firms respond to these shocks by changing wages,  prices,  and employ- 
ment.  In equilibrium,  aggregate employment  reflects the size  of these 
shocks and the importance of downward rigidity.  The shocks are sym- 
metric  around a  rising  trend that corresponds  to  aggregate  nominal 
growth and a steady inflation rate. In the absence of downward rigidity 
in nominal wages,  the response of firms to shocks is symmetric and the 
model  has a natural unemployment  rate. However,  when  a firm's re- 
sponse  to  a negative  shock  is  constrained  by  downward rigidity,  its 
wage  and price are high and its employment  is low,  compared to un- 
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firms raises  the  average  level  of  both  wages  and prices  (although  it 
leaves  real wages  unaffected)  and raises total unemployment. 
In the authors' model,  the sustainable  unemployment  rate thus de- 
pends  on the fraction  of  firms that are constrained.  This  fraction,  in 
turn, depends  on the  inflation rate and the trend rate of  productivity 
growth,  which  sum  to  the  mean  change  in  nominal  wages.  With  a 
moderately high mean wage  increase,  very few  firms receive  negative 
shocks  large enough  to hit the zero constraint on their wage  setting, 
and so the sustainable unemployment rate is the natural rate that would 
prevail  in  the  absence  of  downward  rigidity.  But  as the  mean  wage 
increase declines,  the fraction of firms constrained rises nonlinearly and 
the effect  on the sustainable unemployment  rate becomes  noticeable. 
To quantify this effect,  the authors simulate their model using com- 
binations of parameters that replicate known characteristics of the U.S. 
economy,  including rates of job creation or destruction and the disper- 
sion of annual wage changes.  Consistent  with typical recent estimates 
of  the  natural rate,  they  also  choose  5.8  percent  as  the  sustainable 
unemployment  rate with recent productivity trends and 3 percent infla- 
tion.  They then simulate the model to find how this sustainable unem- 
ployment  rate would  change  if the inflation rate were zero instead of 
3 percent.  They choose  random combinations  of parameter values that 
generate the specified characteristics of the economy,  each combination 
giving  rise to a different equilibrium unemployment rate at zero infla- 
tion.  In this way  they obtain a range of values  for the increase  in the 
equilibrium unemployment  rate associated with going to zero inflation. 
The median  increase  is  2.1  percentage  points; the tenth percentile  of 
the range is  1 percentage point and the ninetieth percentile  is 5.7  per- 
centage  points.  The  authors also  report on  several  variations  of  the 
central simulations.  These  give  median increases  in unemployment  of 
near 1.5 percentage points. 
Akerlof,  Dickens,  and Perry also develop  a variant of the model that 
can be estimated with time-series  data by using nonlinear least squares. 
This time-series  model  augments the standard natural rate model with 
a time-varying term that captures the effects of downward rigidity. This 
term, reflecting the number of firms that are constrained from reducing 
wages  and the amount by which they are constrained,  is constructed to 
capture the detailed  features of the main model.  In effect,  it measures 
distortions  in unit labor costs  constructed  so  as to be  additive  to the William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xiii 
effects  of unemployment and expected inflation, the other determinants 
of  inflation  in the time-series  model.  The value  of  the added term is 
calculated period by period in the process of estimating the coefficients 
of these other determinants. 
Because  the effects  of  downward rigidity  are important only  when 
median  wage  increases  are low,  it is  difficult  to test  the model  with 
postwar time-series  data, which offer few such observations,  and so the 
estimated equation does  not clearly dominate the standard natural rate 
model in this time period.  However,  when the authors use the postwar 
equations  for  out-of-sample  simulations  of  the  Great Depression,  a 
period  in  which  prices  and wages  initially  declined,  the  results  are 
striking.  Their model  captures the price changes  of  the entire period 
remarkably well,  while  the  standard natural rate model  captures the 
deflation of the initial years but fails completely  thereafter. 
The authors make several observations  about the robustness of their 
time-series  results.  They show that their postwar estimates  are not sig- 
nificantly different  from estimates  that combine  the Great Depression 
and postwar periods or from estimates  for the Great Depression  alone. 
They report that a version of their model that allows price-wage margins 
and real wages  to vary performs about as well  in simulating the Great 
Depression,  as the central model does.  They also note that the steady- 
state characteristics of the time-series  equation correspond reasonably 
well  with the characteristics  of  the simulation  model.  In the postwar 
estimate  of  the time-series  model,  the lowest  sustainable  rate of  un- 
employment  is 5.2  percent and the difference  between  the sustainable 
unemployment  rates  at zero  inflation  and  3  percent  inflation  is  2.6 
percentage points. 
The authors' model is particularly relevant in current economic  cir- 
cumstances.  With  trend productivity  growing  slowly  in the  United 
States and other advanced industrial nations, zero inflation would bring 
forth the  inefficiencies  that raise the sustainable  unemployment  rate. 
The authors emphasize  that the higher unemployment  rates that their 
model  predicts  are permanent,  and are quite distinct  from the tempo- 
rarily higher unemployment  rates that any model would associate  with 
a transition to zero inflation.  They  illustrate both the transitional and 
permanent costs  by using  their estimated equation to compare the un- 
employment  paths when monetary authorities choose  to reduce the in- 
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first three years the paths coincide  and unemployment  rises  by 2 per- 
centage  points.  After that,  with the 3 percent inflation target,  unem- 
ployment  falls  rapidly and is stable by year five.  With the zero target, 
unemployment  rises by nearly 3 points more, peaking in the sixth year 
and then stabilizing  in year eight.  The higher transitional costs are thus 
very substantial.  But the permanent costs  are the additional 2.6  points 
of unemployment  that persist indefinitely. 
The authors recognize  that any such point estimate of the unemploy- 
ment cost of zero inflation is subject to a considerable range of uncer- 
tainty.  Nonetheless,  on the basis of their overall results with the time- 
series  model  and the results of their simulation model,  they are confi- 
dent that the effects  are large enough  to be important in both framing 
policy  and modeling the macroeconomy.  They believe  downward wage 
rigidity to be deeply rooted in relations between firms and workers and 
unlikely to disappear under any foreseeable  set of policies  or economic 
outcomes.  Moreover,  they reason that one should not want to get rid of 
it even if one could,  observing that downward rigidity helps to stabilize 
the economy  against extreme outcomes by reducing deflationary expec- 
tations,  permitting real interest rates to fall,  and preventing the bank- 
ruptcies that accompany debt deflation. Rather than denying its impor- 
tance or anticipating  that it will  give  way under some  policy  regime, 
the authors urge policymakers  to recognize  the implications  of down- 
ward rigidity in framing policy  goals.  The central implication  is that a 
moderate inflation rate,  such as the U.S.  economy  has recently  expe- 
rienced,  permits the lowest  sustainable unemployment rate; the current 
enthusiasm  for driving inflation to zero is misguided. 
SINCE  THE  CREATION  of the Federal Reserve,  there has been recur- 
rent tension  between  its  desire  for  independence  and the Congress's 
desire  for oversight  and control.  One way in which the Congress  can 
exercise  control  over the Federal Reserve  is by mandating targets for 
monetary policy  or rules for its conduct.  Beginning  in 1975,  the Con- 
gress  required the  Federal  Reserve  to  establish  publicly  announced, 
numerical money growth targets and to report regularly to the Congress 
on  its  success  in  meeting  them.  In  1979  the  Federal  Reserve  itself 
publicly  declared  its dedication  to controlling  money  growth and im- 
plemented  new  day-to-day  operating procedures designed  to enhance 
its  ability  to  do  so,  although  some  observers  suggested  that the  an- William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xv 
nounced targets were more form than substance.  Before  long,  the Fed 
began to downplay  these  monetary targets.  In 1987 it gave  up targets 
for Ml,  the narrow money stock,  and in 1993 it publicly acknowledged 
that it  had  downgraded  the  remaining  broad money  growth  targets, 
including  M2.  In recent years there has been a resurgence of congres- 
sional  interest in mandating rules for the conduct of monetary policy, 
this  time  in  the  form  of  an inflation  or price  stability  target.  In the 
second  article in this issue,  Benjamin  Friedman and Kenneth Kuttner 
evaluate the experience  following  the imposition  of targets for money 
growth,  exploring  both the extent  to which  the conduct  of  monetary 
policy  was  affected  by the targets,  and the reasons for the decline  in 
their influence.  Finding that the abandonment of money growth targets 
was a sensible  response to the collapse  of prior empirical relationships 
between  money  and either output or prices,  they go on to examine  the 
reasons  for  that collapse.  They  then draw general  lessons  about the 
wisdom  of  imposing  a goal  such  as price  stability  on  the  Federal 
Reserve. 
How does one assess the extent to which the Federal Reserve actually 
attempted to implement stated targets for money growth? Friedman and 
Kuttner note that if there never were any disturbances to the relation- 
ships connecting  money to the ultimate objectives  of low inflation and 
real economic  activity,  pursuing a money growth target would be em- 
pirically  indistinguishable  from pursuing  policies  aimed  directly  at 
these  ultimate  objectives  themselves.  This  observation  leads  them to 
examine  a stylized  Fed policy  reaction function to see whether devia- 
tions  of  money  from its target influenced policy,  after controlling  for 
the effects  of inflation and unemployment.  They estimate this reaction 
function  using  monthly  data  from  1960  through  1986  for  M1,  and 
through  1995  for  M2,  taking  the  federal  funds  rate to  be  the  direct 
measure of  monetary policy  actions  and using  data corresponding  to 
what policymakers  saw and construed as money aggregates at the time. 
The reaction function includes inflation over the last twelve months and 
the unemployment  gap,  both lagged one and two periods. 
Regression  estimates for this reaction function are roughly consistent 
with  the standard view  of  the Fed's  policy.  Higher inflation,  and in- 
creases in inflation,  tend to increase the federal funds rate, and a larger 
unemployment  gap tends to lower the rate. Deviations  of M1 from its 
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significant,  indicates  that a money  stock  1 percent above target is as- 
sociated  with  a 50  basis  points  higher funds  rate. The  authors make 
clear that this does not necessarily  mean that the Fed is targeting money 
per se-the  positive  coefficient  may simply  mean that the money  de- 
viation is treated as information about the likely course of the economy, 
or that it is correlated with other predictors or objectives,  such as the 
exchange  rate,  that  are not  included  in  the  equation.  The  equation 
displays severe serial correlation, and when it is reestimated with lagged 
values  of the federal funds rate as an additional explanatory variable, 
the  importance  of  inflation  is  reduced  and the  equilibrium  effect  of 
money  deviation  becomes  implausibly  large,  although the coefficient 
on money is still only marginally significant.  When the authors run the 
equation allowing  a separate coefficient  on the money deviation for the 
period 1979:10-1982:9,  the results support the belief of many observers 
that the Fed placed greater emphasis on MI during this period. Without 
lags  on  the  funds  rate,  the equation  implies  that a  1 percent  money 
deviation  raises the funds rate by about 1.5 percent; adding the lagged 
funds rate again gives  implausibly  large effects. 
Most observers,  and the Fed's own announcements,  suggest that the 
weight  placed  on deviations  of  the money  stock from targeted levels 
changed gradually over time,  rather than in discrete jumps up and then 
down.  This  leads  the authors to estimate  the policy  reaction function 
using  an explicit  time-varying-parameter  model for the coefficient  on 
money deviations  from target. The authors estimate the equation in two 
ways:  recursively,  so  that any given  month's  estimate  relies  on  data 
only through that month, and retrospectively,  using data from the entire 
sample.  The  first estimates  are what a contemporaneous  econometric 
observer would have believed.  The second,  "smoothed,"  estimates are 
what  an economic  historian  would  believe  about the reaction  coeffi- 
cients  in  each  period,  given  observations  both  after and before  the 
period in question.  The two sets of estimates  are not dramatically dif- 
ferent,  except  that those  based on the entire sample are more reliably 
estimated  for the early part of  the sample  and do not bounce  around 
nearly as much as the recursive  estimates.  These  smoothed  estimates 
show a positive  and significant response of the funds rate to a 1 percent 
mon.ey stock deviation,  beginning  in 1976 at about 0.1  percent,  rising 
to a peak of about 0.25  percent in late 1980, and falling to insignificance 
by  1984.  The  authors present  similar  analyses  using  unborrowed re- William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xvii 
serves  rather than the funds rate as the indicator of policy  action,  and 
examining  the deviation  of  M2 rather than MI  from its target. These 
all suggest  roughly the same conclusion  as the basic analysis: the Fed- 
eral Reserve's  response  to  deviations  of  either MI  or M2 from their 
target levels  built  up slowly  following  the  congressional  resolution, 
peaked around 1980,  and then gradually declined,  so that by  1984 the 
response  was insignificant. 
What has  led the Fed to disregard the instructions  given  it by the 
Congress,  even  though they are still  in effect?  The authors show that 
the decline in the weight given to money in formulating policy followed 
a decline  in the usefulness  of money  for forecasting  inflation and real 
output. They estimate a four-variable vector autoregression using quar- 
terly data on real gross domestic  product, the corresponding price de- 
flator, the stock  of  MI,  and the federal funds rate. The variables  are 
included in that order, so that innovations  in money are only given the 
opportunity to explain  variations in output and prices not explained by 
innovations  in those variables themselves,  but they are given credit for 
any effects  of correlated surprises in the funds rate. Because  they are 
ultimately interested in what an empirically minded policymaker would 
believe  about the  value  of  money  targets at the time  when  policy  is 
actually being  set,  the authors estimate  this relationship for each time 
period using data only from prior periods.  For each overlapping sample 
period,  they calculate  the contribution of  money  to explaining  subse- 
quent movements  in real output and prices at a two-year horizon.  The 
results show  that as of  1975,  the first date for which they do the cal- 
culation,  recent  movements  of  MI  explain  only  about 6  percent  of 
output movements and about 14 percent of the movement in prices. The 
importance of money in explaining output increases sharply in the early 
1980s, becoming  highly significant for a brief period, and then declines 
to insignificance  after the mid-1980s.  The contribution of  MI  to ex- 
plaining subsequent price fluctuations increases rapidly in both magni- 
tude and statistical  significance  after 1975,  only to decline  even  more 
rapidly and lose  significance  in the early  1980s and beyond. 
The authors explicitly  test the hypothesis  that money has no predic- 
tive power at all by estimating a difference form of equations for prices 
and output using four lags of the same four explanatory variables.  The 
coefficient  on MI  in the output equation is not significant in any of the 
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in explaining  prices judged from any vantage point through early 1983. 
After  1983,  however,  it  loses  all  explanatory  power  for prices.  M2 
performs even  worse.  At no point does  it have significant explanatory 
power for either output or prices. The authors believe that policymakers 
recognized  this lack of connection  between  money  and the Fed's  ulti- 
mate objectives,  and that this explains  why the Fed abandoned money 
targets. They cite the quip attributed to former governor of the Bank of 
Canada John Crow: "We didn't abandon the monetary aggregates; they 
abandoned us." 
Having found that money had lost most of its explanatory power by 
the mid-1980s,  Friedman and Kuttner try to determine why.  They find 
no evidence  that increased  stability  in the growth rates of  aggregates, 
an objective of many monetarist economists,  was responsible.  To assess 
other possibilities,  they examine the implications of various restrictions 
on their vector autoregressions  that enable them to identify  the effects 
of policy.  In particular, they assume that none of the "demand-side" 
disturbances  have  a long-run  effect  on  the  level  of  real output,  that 
neither  money  demand  nor  supply  disturbances  have  within-quarter 
effects  on real output,  and that the demand for real money  balances 
depends  only  on real output and the nominal  interest rate. They  find 
there are substantial variations  over time  in the absolute  and relative 
magnitude of  structural shocks,  many of  which,  including  the OPEC 
price shocks,  accord with most economists'  priors. Their findings do 
not support the view  that the decline  in the predictive power of money 
reflects increased success  with using money to offset shocks originating 
from other sources.  For the most recent years, their structural analysis 
does  provide  some  modest  support for the view  that the ability of the 
Federal Reserve  to influence economic  activity has diminished.  Fried- 
man and Kuttner conclude  that the increasing instability of money de- 
mand is the most plausible  explanation for the fact that money growth 
ceased to anticipate fluctuations in either output or prices after the mid- 
1980s. 
They  then turn to  a discussion  of  the currently pending  Economic 
Growth and Price Stability Act,  which would give the Federal Reserve 
two basic  monetary policy  instructions:  "(1)  establish  an explicit  nu- 
merical definition of the term 'price stability';  and (2) maintain a mon- 
etary policy  that effectively  promotes long-term price stability."  The 
authors note that the proposed bill would  significantly  change the ob- William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xix 
jectives  of  the Fed by effectively  instructing it to focus  only  on price 
stability and removing  maximum employment  and moderate long-term 
interest rates as goals.  Friedman and Kuttner recognize  that the Con- 
gress has a legitimate  right to specify  basic goals for monetary policy. 
Having implicitly  criticized  the Congress for setting targets for money 
growth,  they  note  that granting  "instrument  independence,"  which 
allows  the Fed  to  decide  the best  way  to  achieve  specified  goals,  is 
consistent  with the Congress  specifying  what those goals  should be. 
However,  even if price stability were taken to be an ultimate objec- 
tive of government  policy,  Friedman and Kuttner argue, directing the 
Fed to achieve this goal would not produce good monetary policy.  They 
cite a considerable  body of analysis on optimal policy  design  showing 
that pursuing a target for inflation-or  any other particular variable- 
is not a good way to conduct monetary policy  in the presence of supply 
or productivity  shocks  and wage  inflexibility.  The optimal policy  re- 
gime depends,  not surprisingly,  on the behavioral characteristics of the 
economy  and on  the relative  magnitude  of  the  shocks  to  which  it is 
subject.  The  authors note  that the performance  of  the United  States 
following  the OPEC shocks  of  1973 and 1979 was superior to that of 
the European economies,  and suggest  that allowing  the price level  to 
adjust was an important element  of that better performance. 
As  one  lesson  of  their  article,  the  authors conclude  that  a  price 
stability  rule,  even  if  it appeared benign  in the present environment, 
would not be sensible.  If the Congress legislated  a price stability target 
and productivity or supply shocks became more volatile,  for example, 
the Federal Reserve  would once again face the dilemma of either hold- 
ing  to  a poorly  designed  monetary policy  framework or disregarding 
the legal  instructions given  it by the Congress. 
BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS  crises  have  often  upset the economies  of 
developing  countries.  The Mexican peso crisis of December  1994, with 
its spillover into the financial markets of other developing  countries and 
its devastating  impact on the subsequent performance of  the Mexican 
economy,  renewed the debate over why such crises occur and how they 
can be avoided.  In the third article in this volume,  Jeffrey Sachs, Aaron 
Tornell,  and Andres Velasco  examine the Mexican crisis and its after- 
math in an attempt to answer these questions.  They observe that various 
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some  assert that Mexico's  large current account deficit inevitably  led 
to the loss  of  confidence  and reversal of capital flows  that caused  the 
crisis.  But other developing  nations had equally  large current account 
deficits  and yet experienced  no problem with capital flows.  Similarly, 
spillover  effects  were not inevitable.  Some developing  economies  suf- 
fered  in  the  wake  of  the  Mexican  crisis,  while  others  were  largely 
unaffected. To go beyond such simple explanations,  the authors develop 
a model  that takes account of  more than one aspect of economic  per- 
formance and financial exposure,  and they use the great variation in the 
experiences  of other developing  countries following  the Mexican crisis 
to test it. 
Sachs,  Tornell,  and Velasco  first present a theoretical model to help 
in understanding the process  by which a crisis  in one country spreads 
to others,  the "Tequila  effect."  They hypothesize  that three factors- 
the level  of the real exchange  rate, the strength of the banking system, 
and the adequacy of international reserves-determine  how vulnerable 
a country is in such a situation,  reasoning  as follows.  Confronted by 
the heightened  risk of  depreciation  that accompanies  a crisis  in a de- 
veloping  country,  nervous investors will  want to withdraw funds from 
other developing  countries.  Unless  it has plentiful reserves, the govern- 
ment  of  a country  threatened  by  such  capital  outflows  will  need  to 
improve its current account position to offset them, and this will require 
a recession  or currency  depreciation.  The  more  overvalued  the  real 
exchange  rate, the larger the nominal devaluation that is needed.  And 
the weaker  the banking  system,  the more dangerous  a recession  will 
be. Thus the risk of a large depreciation is greater the smaller the reserve 
position,  the weaker the banking system,  and the more overvalued the 
real exchange  rate. The authors refer to these last two factors as "fun- 
damentals"  of an economy's  position. 
The authors' model permits multiple equilibria,  in that the economy 
can settle at more than one position,  depending on how investors eval- 
uate the country's  fundamentals  and the adequacy  of  its reserves.  If 
these three factors leave them confident that a devaluation will not take 
place,  the pressures from capital flows will subside and their confidence 
will  be rewarded.  If the fundamentals and reserves suggest  the risk of 
devaluation  is high,  that perceived  risk is likely  to become  reality. 
The authors test their model by using it to explain pressures on the 
foreign  exchange  markets of  twenty  developing  countries  during the William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xxi 
months following  the Mexican  crisis.  To measure exchange  rate pres- 
sures in this period,  they construct for each country a crisis index that 
is a weighted  average of the devaluation rate relative to the dollar and 
the percent change in foreign exchange  reserves.  A higher value of the 
index indicates  a greater Tequila effect.  To measure the fundamentals 
and reserves position that their model suggests are important in explain- 
ing the crisis index, they calculate for each country the real appreciation 
relative to a base period as an indicator of overvaluation; the change in 
the ratio of bank claims on the private sector to GDP as an indicator of 
lending booms that would leave the banking sector vulnerable; and the 
ratio of  M2  to  international reserves  as an indicator of  reserves  ade- 
quacy.  They  then  group  the  countries  in  their  sample  according  to 
whether they are strong or weak in each of these dimensions.  Thus in 
their central case,  if a country is in the top quartile in both real exchange 
rate position  and bank vulnerability,  it is  identified  as having  strong 
fundamentals,  and if it is in the top quartile in reserves,  it is identified 
as having a strong reserve position. 
The authors use these rankings of strong or weak to look for nonlinear 
effects  of their basic  variables on the crisis  index.  The main idea that 
they  test  is  that the  effect  of  reserves  and bank positions  should  be 
nonlinear  and  large  only  when  both  reserves  and  fundamentals  are 
weak.  Using  dummy variables to identify countries as either strong or 
weak,  the authors find general support for their basic model  in cross- 
country regressions that explain the crisis index in the months following 
the Mexican  crisis.  The results are robust when they vary the number 
of  months over  which  they  measure the crisis  index,  when they vary 
the cut-off  for identifying  a country's  position  as weak or strong,  and 
when they omit individual outlier observations from their sample.  It is 
clear that contagion  from the Mexican crisis  was not random. Rather, 
countries  were  vulnerable  if  they  had low  reserves  and had recently 
experienced  either real appreciations,  or steep increases  in bank lend- 
ing,  or both. 
Sachs,  Tornell,  and Velasco  also  evaluate  a number of  alternative 
ideas that have been offered to explain the vulnerability of a country to 
capital  flow  reversals.  They  do this  in two  ways:  first,  by  adding to 
their basic cross-country  regression  a variable that captures each idea; 
and second,  by examining  that variable in eight countries: Argentina, 
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Colombia,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and Thailand,  which fared well.  One 
such idea  is that large capital  inflows  leave  a country exposed  to the 
changing moods of Wall Street traders. But the ratio of capital inflows 
to GDP between  1990 and 1994 is not significant in regressions,  either 
as an average  or a change.  Moreover,  it does  not help to explain  the 
performances  of  individual  countries;  the  ratio is  higher  rather than 
lower  in  the  countries  that fared  well.  The  authors conclude  that if 
capital inflows  matter, they do so not directly,  but by affecting the real 
exchange  rate and bank lending. 
Another idea is that the composition  of capital inflows matters. Long- 
term flows,  such as direct foreign investment,  are good either because 
they  are unlikely  to  be  reversed  or because  they  add to  productive 
capacity,  while  short-term flows  are bad either because they are easily 
reversed or because  they are associated  with consumption booms.  The 
authors find some support for this idea in their regressions; the ratio of 
short-term flow to GDP is marginally significant when reserves are low 
and fundamentals  are weak.  But short-term flows  fail  to discriminate 
between  the  individual  weak  and strong countries  in that part of  the 
analysis.  Using  the same  procedures,  the authors fail  to find support 
for several  other plausible  ideas: large current account deficits,  loose 
fiscal  policies,  low  saving  rates,  and low  investment  rates are all re- 
jected  as explanatory variables for a country's  vulnerability to crisis. 
Returning to their positive  findings that the real exchange rate, bank 
lending,  and the level  of international reserves help to explain  vulner- 
ability,  the authors discuss  what accounts for changes  in these crucial 
variables.  Looking  first at real exchange rates, they find no correlation 
between  these  and the size  of  capital inflows.  And they find that this 
lack  of  correlation  is  not explained  by the sterilization  of  inflows  by 
central banks,  or by offsetting  fiscal contractions,  or even by identifi- 
able  differences  in the  structure of  economies.  However,  when  they 
examine whether nominal exchange rate policy can offset the effects  of 
capital flows on the real exchange  rate, they find evidence  that in three 
countries-Indonesia,  Colombia,  and Chile-it  did succeed  in doing 
so,  at least  for a time.  Turning to  lending  booms,  the authors find a 
clear link between booms and subsequent financial crises and emphasize 
that it is not the level  of  bank lending  relative  to output that matters, 
but rather, abrupt increases  in such lending.  They  find that domestic 
financial  liberalization,  but not  liberalization  of  international capital William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xxiii 
accounts,  has often led to lending booms. Except where there have been 
explicit  efforts  to contain credit growth,  the privatization and deregu- 
lation of banking has often been accompanied by lending booms and a 
deterioration  in credit  quality.  Thus they  conclude  that the domestic 
regulatory environment,  which is often not well equipped to deal with 
the volatile  environment of emerging markets, may be crucial to avoid- 
ing crises. 
T  H E  H I S T O R I C  C O L L A P S E of the Soviet Union at the end of the last 
decade led to its dissolution  into fifteen countries and the end of Soviet 
domination in seven  other nations in central and eastern Europe. Most 
of  these  countries  experienced  a rapid decline  in the influence  of  the 
communist party, a struggle for political  power,  and the disintegration 
of the economic  system.  From the start, thoughtful analysts recognized 
that economic  change  and the political  acceptablity  of  proposals  for 
reform would interact in many ways.  Some believed that reforms should 
be rapid and comprehensive  because  the window  of political  opportu- 
nity would be open only briefly and because reforms, once made, would 
be hard to reverse.  Others argued for gradual reform, so as to minimize 
the individual hardships that drastic change would inevitably bring and 
thus  to  make  reform  more  politically  acceptable  and more  likely  to 
survive.  In fact,  the countries that emerged from the Soviet  bloc have 
differed in the scope and timing of their reforms, the degree of political 
change,  and their economic  performance.  In the fourth article in this 
volume,  Anders Aslund,  Peter Boone,  and Simon Johnson assess these 
diverse experiences  and draw lessons about the interaction of economics 
and politics  in  the process  of  reforming  transition economies.  They 
pose  and answer four main questions.  Has radical reform been  more 
costly  or  more  beneficial,  in  economic  terms,  than gradual reform? 
What considerations  have  determined the choice  of  reform strategy? 
How  did  radical  reformers  fare  in  subsequent  elections?  And,  what 
tactics have been effective  for introducing and maintaining reforms? 
Addressing  the first of  these  questions  raises  difficult  problems  of 
both measurement  and definition.  Output changes,  which  the authors 
take as the main indicators of the success of reform, cannot be measured 
with any precision when either relative prices or the proportion of output 
produced by different sectors changes drastically.  All post-communist 
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away from central control toward a free market, and many, especially 
Russia,  experienced  large sectoral shifts away from heavy industry and 
military-related  production.  The problems  with measuring output are 
compounded  if,  as in many of the transition economies,  the output of 
numerous small,  new enterprises is not captured in available statistics. 
Measuring the intensity  of reform also raises issues  of definition.  The 
authors use two criteria: one is the degree of macro stabilization,  mea- 
sured by how rapidly inflation was brought under control; and the other 
is the extent  of micro liberalization,  measured by an index created by 
World Bank country experts who took account of the liberalization  of 
internal prices,  foreign trade, and private sector entry. 
Aslund,  Boone,  and Johnson  are aware of  the  imprecision  of  the 
measures at their disposal  but expect  that strong effects,  if they exist, 
will  nonetheless  show through in their analysis.  In their cross-country 
regressions,  they find that the change  in output over the period  1989- 
95  is positively  related (meaning,  it declines  less)  to both macro sta- 
bilization  and micro  liberalization.  However,  the significance  of  the 
relation disappears if the countries of the former Soviet Union and those 
suffering from war during the transition period are identified separately 
by  dummy  variables.  The  overall  relation  reflects  the  worse  perfor- 
mance  of  these  countries  compared  to  the  others;  there  is  no  clear 
relation  within  either  group.  However,  when  the  authors turn from 
cumulative  output change  to relate output growth in  1995 to their in- 
dicators of  reform,  they find a positive  relation that is robust to these 
same dummy variables.  From these results and a consideration  of  in- 
dividual country experiences,  the authors infer that inherited structural 
conditions  at the start of the reform period were important in determin- 
ing subsequent economic  performance.  Allowing  for such differences, 
they find no evidence  that more radical reform led to larger cumulative 
output declines,  and some  evidence  that early and substantial reform 
was related,  eventually,  to good  output performance.  The importance 
of initial considerations  was also emphasized  by those commenting  on 
the paper at the meeting.  They observed that since the initial conditions 
that made radical reform feasible  were also conditions  that made good 
performance possible,  it is difficult  to identify  the independent effect 
of reforms on performance. 
In the debates over whether to reform radically or gradually,  many 
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accompany radical reform. Using  unemployment  as a measure of such 
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costs,  Aslund,  Boone,  and Johnson  find no evidence  that costs  were 
greater under radical reform policies.  Employing the same dummy var- 
iables  as  they  used  for  their  analysis  of  output,  they  find no  cross- 
country  relation  between  unemployment  and either  their  macroeco- 
nomic  or microeconomic  indicators of the intensity of reform. And in 
defiance  of  Okun's  law,  they find no relation between  unemployment 
and output across countries.  Looking  at individual countries,  they ob- 
serve large differences  between  outcomes  in central Europe and in the 
former Soviet  Union,  and note that unemployment  in the latter group 
has remained puzzlingly  low  in light of  the severe  output declines  in 
those  countries.  These  findings  may reflect the uneven  quality of  un- 
employment  data and extremely  high  hidden  unemployment  in  state 
enterprises.  It is not possible  to quantify such effects,  and the authors 
simply observe that unemployment has been a surprisingly limited prob- 
lem in the transition economies. 
Turning to the politics  of reform,  Aslund,  Boone,  and Johnson ask 
why some  countries  pursued radical reform,  while  many others chose 
to  reform  only  gradually.  Their  answer  stresses  the  different  initial 
political conditions  across countries and the power structures that arose 
from  them.  In most  countries  the  collapse  of  communism  created  a 
political vacuum. In some nations, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
early elections  allowed  the powers of leadership to be consolidated  and 
defined. In some,  including most of the nations of central Asia,  former 
elites  reinforced their positions  when Moscow's  power broke down.  In 
others,  most  notably  Russia,  government  leaders fought  actively  for 
power,  setting the interests of former elites  against the goals of liberal 
reformers.  The  authors further observe  that whoever  did gain  power 
faced  few  checks  and balances  on  their behavior  and thus had great 
opportunities for both the abuse of power and for enlightened  change. 
To  help  in  understanding  the  varied  outcomes  that emerged,  the 
authors produce a model  of rent-seeking  behavior by those  in power, 
where they define rent seeking  as activities  that, unlike the allocation 
of resources,  serve  no social  purpose,  but only  capture returns. They 
associate  rent seeking  with high inflation, which,  in turn, is associated 
with  a lack  of  economic  reform.  The primary avenues  used  by  state 
enterprise managers and government officials to capture rents have been 
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trols. The authors estimate that in Russia the potential rents from these 
sources  amounted to an incredible 55 to 75 percent of GNP in 1992. 
One main message from this analysis is that gradual reform was more 
likely  to be the result of rent-seeking  behavior by those in power than 
an altruistic concern  for those  who  might be hurt by more radical re- 
form.  While  the pursuit of  rents has so  far impeded  reform in many 
countries,  the  authors suggest  that the  scope  for further exploitation 
may have now diminished as a consequence  both of economic  improve- 
ments,  such as the movement  of tradeable goods  prices toward world 
levels,  and political  change that, in many countries,  has made govern- 
ment leaders more responsive  to public opinion. 
As another way of judging the social costs of radical reform, Aslund, 
Boone,  and Johnson examine  the popularity of reforms,  as reflected in 
election  results and opinion polls.  Proreform parties have lost elections 
in  a number of  countries,  starting with  Lithuania  in  late  1992,  and 
subsequently  in Poland,  Russia,  Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia,  and Lat- 
via. These elections  have led to a general impression that reform parties 
have been repudiated by the voters,  with the implication  that reforms 
have,  on balance,  brought social  costs that have made them unpopular 
with the public.  However,  the authors argue that a careful analysis  of 
the election  results do not support such a strong inference.  In part, the 
political  outcomes  do not measure political  sentiment. The center right 
parties have been more fragmented than the former communist parties 
and peasant parties,  and this fragmentation has allowed  former com- 
munists to get a larger proportion of seats than their proportion of the 
popular vote.  In the second  election  following  democratization,  com- 
munist  parties  won  as  much  as  40  percent  of  the  vote  in just  three 
countries: Lithuania, Moldova,  and Mongolia.  Only in the last two did 
communists  gain an absolute majority. Throughout the region,  modest 
pluralities were often converted into controlling majorities of legislative 
seats,  thus making these  legislative  victories  an exaggerated  indicator 
of the popularity of the communist parties. 
Turning to the specifics  of how the intensity of reform affected  sub- 
sequent elections,  the authors show that four out of the six governments 
that pursued radical reform were reelected.  Furthermore, three of the 
four European non-socialist  governments  that pursued gradual reform 
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polls  support this analysis.  Only in three radically reforming countries 
are people  reasonably optimistic  about the future. 
The  authors draw several  inferences  from their electoral  analysis. 
There is no suggestion  that slowing  reform raised the odds of winning 
elections.  And,  except  in Estonia,  there is no clear sign  of  a popular 
backlash against radical reform. In the transition economies,  most in- 
cumbent governments  became unpopular regardl'ess of their economic 
program. But there has been very little backtracking on reforms,  even 
when communist  parties that have transformed themselves  into social 
democratic parties have won control. 
Informed by their analysis  of  reform to date,  Aslund,  Boone,  and 
Johnson draw lessons  for the future. They see rent seeking as the crucial 
barrier to reform and progress,  and support the positions  of  previous 
analysts,  such as David  Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs (BPEA,  1:1990),  in 
favor  of  radical  reforms  that include  near complete  price  and trade 
liberalization,  the elimination of subsidies,  and early measures to better 
define property rights and governance over state assets.  To accompany 
these economic  changes,  they stress the importance of a free press and 
a democratic political  process  as safeguards against corruption. How- 
ever,  recognizing  that such ideals are often not readily attainable, they 
go on to offer a range of more specific  policies,  drawn from the expe- 
rience of particular countries. 
The authors note that preemptive policy changes can alter the choices 
and payoffs  available  to those subsequently  in power,  citing  as exam- 
ples the Ukrainian central bank's decision  to end hyperinflation during 
a period of political vacuum and the Serbian finance ministry's decision 
to peg the exchange  rate. Once the costs  of these stabilizing  measures 
had been borne,  the costs  of  maintaining stabilization  were relatively 
small,  so  that subsequent  officials  continued  the policies  rather than 
reversing them.  Poison  pills,  resembling  those used to protect against 
corporate  takeovers,  are a related  device  that can  affect  subsequent 
decisions.  As  their prime example,  the authors cite  the establishment 
of  a  currency  board  in  Estonia,  with  rules  that make  a  run on  the 
currency likely  should parliament ever try to alter the exchange  rate. 
The  authors suggest  that conditional  aid can be  a useful  support for 
reform, especially  if it can be used to support measures that reduce the 
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budgetary process  so  as to make it difficult  for any one power group 
to  undo  specific  elements  of  reform  can  provide  protection  against 
backsliding. 
DURING  THE  POSTWAR  period,  the  U.S.  national  saving  rate has 
declined  dramatically.  Since  1980,  the  net  national  saving  rate has 
averaged less than half its level  during the 1950s and 1960s,  and many 
observers  regard this  low  rate as a principal factor in explaining  the 
large U.S.  trade deficit  and low  rate of  capital accumulation  and,  in 
turn, the slow growth in productivity and national income and product. 
While the decline in national saving is undeniable, there is no consensus 
about its cause.  Attempts to explain  the decline  using aggregate time- 
series variables have been inconclusive.  The effects of interest rates are 
not reliably  estimated  and the effects  of  other factors that have  been 
suggested  as explanations,  such as the growth in the value of equities, 
the  growth  in  government-financed  medical  insurance,  and the  in- 
creased availability  of credit to households,  are difficult to disentangle 
using time-series  data. Attempts to use microeconomic  data to investi- 
gate the saving  decline  have  been  similarly  inconclusive.  In the fifth 
article in this issue Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence J. Kotlikoff,  and John 
Sabelhaus make another attempt to explain the puzzle by using a unique 
cohort data set they construct from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys 
for  1960-61,  1972-73,  1984-86,  and 1987-90,  as well  as a host of 
other microeconomic  surveys.  The authors take a broader view of con- 
sumption  than is  taken in most  previous  microeconomic  studies,  in- 
cluding health care as a component of household consumption,  and they 
construct measures of consumption,  income,  and lifetime  resources by 
age  cohort that are consistent  with the national aggregates.  The con- 
structed  data  enable  them  to  allocate  changes  in  national  saving  to 
changes  in  the  propensity  to  consume  of  different  age  cohorts  and 
changes  in the distribution of resources  among cohorts.  According  to 
their calculations,  much of the decline  in national saving can be attrib- 
uted to two factors: a redistribution of resources from young and unborn 
generations with low propensities to consume toward older generations 
with high  consumption  propensities,  and a significant  increase  in the 
consumption  propensities  of older Americans. 
The authors point out that the conventional  distinction between per- 
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for example,  on the particular accounting conventions  adopted to iden- 
tify  the receipts  and expenditures  of government programs. They cite 
social security as a particularly important case in point. If social security 
contributions  were  treated as loans  to the government  rather than as 
taxes,  and if payments of social security benefits were treated as repay- 
ment of  past loans  plus  a tax or subsidy,  there would  be an entirely 
different reported pattern of personal saving in the postwar years but, 
assuming  rational consumption  and saving  behavior,  no difference  in 
national saving.  For example,  the personal saving rate in  1993 would 
have been almost three times as large as the rate reported. As a conse- 
quence,  studies  that look  separately at the decline  in personal saving 
rates and the growth in the government deficit may be very misleading. 
In contrast,  the authors focus  directly on the net national saving  rate, 
defined  as  net  national  product  (NNP)  less  purchases  of  goods  and 
services  by  households  and government  as a fraction of  NNP,  and a 
corresponding measure of private sector saving,  defined as the share of 
NNP  less  government  purchases that is not consumed  by households. 
These  measures  immediately  reveal  that government  spending  is  not 
responsible  for any reduction in the rate of national saving.  Indeed, the 
rate of  government  spending  out of  NNP  has actually  declined  since 
1970. The rate of household consumption,  on the other hand, rose from 
69.9  percent of output in the  1950s to 76.6  percent in the early 1990s. 
Health care spending  was the major contributor to this growth,  rising 
from roughly 4 percent of NNP in the 1950s to well over  12 percent in 
the early  1990s.  The rate of nonmedical  consumption  actually fell  by 
2.2  percentage points over this interval. 
The authors organize  their analysis  of household  consumption,  and 
by  implication,  private sector  saving,  around the life  cycle  model  of 
household  behavior.  This model has two distinctive  features.  First, an 
individual  household's  current consumption  is assumed to depend on 
expected  lifetime  wealth rather than current income.  According  to the 
model,  a household's  saving  in any given  period,  as conventionally 
measured, is simply a reflection of the time pattern of disposable income 
over the life  cycle.  For example,  an increase in a household's  current 
social  security  taxes,  offset  in present  value  by  higher  future social 
security  benefits,  will  leave  consumption  unchanged  but will  lower 
personal  saving.  Second,  aggregate  consumption  behavior  does  not 
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representative  individual,  but depends crucially  on the rate of  growth 
of population  and income.  For example,  in the zero bequest life  cycle 
model used by the authors, with no growth in population or per capita 
income,  aggregate  saving  would  be zero.  If,  as is typically  assumed, 
households  save early in their life cycle and dissave in retirement, more 
rapid population  growth or growth in the incomes  of  successive  gen- 
erations  will  increase  the  aggregate  saving  rate.  Similarly,  unantici- 
pated redistribution of  resources  from the young  to the old  will  raise 
aggregate consumption,  since  the elderly consume  a larger fraction of 
their remaining lifetime  resources than the young. 
To explain the observed changes in aggregate saving over their sam- 
ple period,  the authors compute the values of four variables suggested 
by the life  cycle  model  as the crucial factors in explaining  aggregate 
private consumption-cohort-specific  propensities  to consume  out of 
lifetime  resources,  the shape of the age-resource profile, the age distri- 
bution of the population,  and the resources-to-output  ratio. While  the 
age distribution of the population is readily available,  calculation of the 
other three factors is an elaborate and painstaking process.  The authors 
use cross-section  profiles of consumption by age and sex in a given year 
to  distribute  aggregate  consumption  across  individuals  in  that year. 
Calculation of the distribution of lifetime resources is more complicated 
and requires additional assumptions.  For example,  to compute the hu- 
man wealth component of resources, annual Current  Population Surveys 
are first used to distribute labor income  from the National Income and 
Product Accounts by age and sex for each year. Then the lifetime human 
wealth for an individual of a given  age and sex in a specified year, say 
1973,  is  arrived at by  adding  up the  labor income  attributed to  the 
individual  in  1973,  plus the labor income  of  an individual  in  1974 of 
the same sex  but one  year older,  plus the labor income  of  individuals 
similarly defined for all future years of the individual's  assumed work- 
ing life.  Future incomes are discounted and actuarially adjusted. Similar 
procedures are used to calculate  the present values of other individual 
components  of  wealth,  including  social  security benefits,  private and 
government employee  pension benefits,  welfare benefits, other govern- 
ment transfers, and future taxes,  including indirect taxes, payroll taxes, 
and property taxes.  To  make  these  calculations,  the  authors have  to 
make a variety of assumptions about allocations  among members of the 
population  and within  households  and about discount  rates.  Much of William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xxxi 
the article  is  devoted  to describing  the calculations  and the resulting 
values.  In a number of  cases,  the authors test the sensitivity  of  their 
results by performing the calculations  under alternative assumptions. 
Their calculations  reveal  several  striking changes  over  the period 
sampled.  There  has  been  a remarkable increase  in  the relative  con- 
sumption of the elderly between  1960-61  and 1987-90.  For example, 
the consumption of seventy-year-olds,  including medical expenditures, 
has grown from roughly 70 percent of the consumption of thirty-year- 
olds in 1960-61  to almost  120 percent of thirty-year-olds'  consumption 
in  1987-90.  Even  excluding  medical  expenditures,  the relative  con- 
sumption of the elderly has grown dramatically. The elderly's  share of 
total household consumption grew by 68 percent over the period, while 
their proportion in the population  grew by less  than 20 percent.  This 
striking increase in the relative consumption of the elderly has coincided 
with an equally remarkable increase in their relative resources. In 1960- 
61 the average resources of seventy-year-olds  were only 55 percent as 
large as those of thirty-year-olds; in 1987-90  they were over 80 percent 
as large.  The authors show that the growth in the present value of net 
transfers to  the  elderly  was  responsible  for  most  of  the rise  in their 
relative  resources.  In  1960-61  the  present  value  of  net  transfers to 
seventy-year-olds  represented 3 percent of per capita resources; in the 
late 1980s the corresponding figure was 22 percent. 
Large  as  it  is,  the  increase  in  the  elderly's  share of  the  nation's 
resources does not fully explain the increase in their consumption.  The 
authors document a substantial increase in the spending propensities of 
older  Americans.  For example,  eighty-year-olds  increased  their pro- 
pensity  to consume  from less  than 9 percent to more than 13 percent 
over the entire period sampled.  There has been no corresponding  in- 
crease in the consumption  propensities  of the young and middle-aged. 
Other interesting findings from the authors' calculations  include a siz- 
able decline  in the human wealth ratio for young cohorts, reflecting the 
slow  growth of earned income late in the period and projected into the 
future,  and the  rapid growth  of  wealth  in  the  form  of  pensions  for 
individuals  in their fifties  and sixties. 
The authors perform a variety of counterfactual calculations  to de- 
termine the proximate contribution to changes  in the U.S.  saving rate 
of  each  element  of  their decomposition.  For example,  they  calculate 
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propensities  estimated  for young  and old  cohorts  in  1960-61,  rather 
than the estimated  values  for 1987-90  itself.  Such counterfactual cal- 
culations are repeated for each year and for each of the factors: changes 
in the age-resource distribution, in the average propensities to consume, 
in  the  age  distribution  of  the  population,  in  the  resources-to-output 
ratio,  and in the government  spending  rate. In a number of  cases  the 
results are sensitive  to the discount rate. However,  several conclusions 
seem robust. The increase in the elderly's  spending propensities  and a 
redistribution of resources from future to living generations,  which has 
raised the resources-to-output  ratio, clearly contribute to the decline  in 
the national  saving  rate.  Overall  changes  in the age  distribution,  by 
contrast, have affected the saving rate positively.  Government spending 
during the last three decades  has not been a reason for the decline. 
What explains  the substantial increase in the elderly's  propensity to 
consume?  One plausible  hypothesis  is the substantial increase  in the 
fraction of the elderly's  resources that are in the form of annuities.  In 
the absence  of  annuities,  the elderly  have to worry about the risk of 
outliving  their savings.  The authors cite other work suggesting  that a 
moderately risk-averse  individual with no bequest motive and without 
access  to annuity insurance will,  on average,  consume only two-thirds 
of his or her resources before death. The fraction of the elderly's  wealth 
in annuitized form is estimated to have grown from 16 percent in 1960- 
61 to over 40 percent by the late  1980s,  suggesting  that annuitization 
may  be  an important  reason  for the  increase  in their  consumption 
propensity. 
The authors examine the consequences  of changing various assump- 
tions  that underlie  their calculations.  They  show  that changes  in the 
federal budget on the order of those proposed by the Congress  in De- 
cember  1995 have relatively  little effect.  Similarly,  assuming that in- 
dividuals are myopic and infer their future incomes from the experience 
of older individuals  currently living,  rather than assuming that individ- 
uals have perfect foresight,  makes little difference to their conclusions. 
They  note that their analysis  ignores  bequests  and the possibility  that 
bequests and inter vivos transfers have been declining over time, which, 
if true,  would  mean they  understate the rise in the consumption  pro- 
pensities  of older Americans. 
The authors recognize  that their analysis of the decline in the national 
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current consumption  on expected  lifetime  wealth.  The present value of 
income  flows  far in the future has the same effect  on consumption  as 
does  current income,  and as do components  of  wealth based on quite 
different  sources.  The authors attempt to test this central assumption 
by regressing consumption on the various components of wealth and by 
estimating  separate coefficients  for current flows  and for the present 
value of future flows.  When wealth is broken into broad categories- 
net  worth,  human wealth,  pension  wealth,  and the  present  value  of 
government taxes and transfers-the  coefficients  are substantially dif- 
ferent across  age  cohorts  and types  of  wealth  and offer  only  modest 
support for their application of the life cycle  model.  When current and 
future flows  are distinguished,  the regressions  fall apart, and both the 
signs and magnitudes of the calculated marginal propensities are highly 
sensitive  to  the  precise  list  of  variables  included  in the regressions. 
They conclude  that the data are simply not up to the task of testing the 
life  cycle  model. 
The authors end on a pessimistic  note. They believe  that intergener- 
ational  redistribution  will  continue  in the United  States.  Hence  their 
analysis indicates that national saving rates will remain extremely low, 
or even decline  further, foretelling  anemic rates of domestic investment 
and growth in labor productivity and real wages. 